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ABSTRACT 
 
WHITHER SYNCHRONIZATION? THE EUROPEAN UNION TRANSPORT 
POLICY AND TURKEY 
 
ÇAĞRI YILDIRIM 
M.A. in European Studies Program, Thesis, 2012 
Supervisor: Emre Hatipoğlu   
Keywords: European Union, Europeanization, enlargement process, Turkey’s 
accession process, institutionalism theories, EU Transport Policy, public policy. 
 
This thesis mainly aims to identify opportunities and challenges for bolstering EU – 
Turkey cooperation on transport policy. The identification of the possible areas of 
cooperation is important since the accession process of Turkey has been stalled for 
seven years. By identifying opportunities and challenges in specific areas, the EU 
reform process in Turkey can be again revitalized. Focusing on transport policy, this 
study examines a central puzzle: why Turkey adjusts certain EU policies and technical 
standards while being reluctant to adopt in others.  To explain the variance in the 
harmonization of EU policies, the Europeanization theoretical frameworks in the 
accession process are examined. And this study clearly shows that existing 
Europeanization approaches are not helpful in the Turkish case. It, then, suggests that 
this puzzle would be tackled by using novel theoretical framework which is borrowed 
from Public Policy literature developed in the United States. From this a pair of related 
hypotheses are developed mainly suggest that distributive policies will be more easily 
adopted than redistributive policies in candidate countries. To test them, two policy 
cases one with predominantly distributive implications and the other with mostly 
redistributive implications are selected and processed.  
The main findings of this study are as follows: first, Turkey has mostly been successful 
in adopting of EU transport policies with distributive impacts. Secondly, 
synchronization of transport policies with redistributive impacts, however, has been less 
promising, especially without a full membership perspective.  
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
SENKRONĐZASYON NEREYE? AVRUPA BĐRLĐĞĐ ULAŞTIRMA 
POLĐTĐKASI VE TÜRKĐYE 
ÇAĞRI YILDIRIM 
Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, 2012 
Danışman: Emre Hatipoğlu   
Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Avrupalılaşma, genişleme süreci, Türkiye’nin giriş 
süreci, kurumsallık teorileri, AB Ulaştırma Politikası, kamu politikası. 
 
Bu tez ağırlıklı olarak taşımacılık politikası üzerindeki fırsatları ve zorlukları 
tanımlayarak Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği arasındaki üyelik sürecini yeniden 
canlandırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği’ne katılım sürecinin yedi 
yıldır tıkandığı gözönüne alınca, işbirliğinin mümkün olduğu alanları tanımlamanın 
önemli olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Belirli alanlardaki fırsatların ve zorlukların 
tanımlanması ile, Türkiye’deki reform süreci yeniden canlanabilir. Bu çalışmanın ana 
sorusu neden Türkiye’nin belli AB politikaları ve teknik standartlarını uyarlarken, 
diğerlerinde tereddütte kalmasıdır. AB politikalarının ve standartlarının 
uyarlanmasındaki bu değişkenliğe cevap vermek için öncelikle katılım sürecindeki  
Avrupalılaşma kavramının teorik çatısı incelenmiştir. Bu çalışma açık bir biçimde 
göstermiştir ki varolan Avrupalılaşma yaklaşımlarının Türkiye örneğine yardımcı 
olmamasıdır. Bu tez bu sorunun cevabının Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’in kamu 
politikaları literatüründe geliştirilmiş olan yeni bir teorik çatı ile bulunabileceğini 
önermektedir. Bu teorik çatıdan geliştirilen birbiriyle ilişkili iki hipotez, dağıtıcı 
politikaların yeniden paylaştırıcı politikalara nazaran üye ülkelerde uygulanmasının 
daha kolay olduğunu belirtmektedir. Bu hipotezleri test etmek için, biri paylaştırıcı 
etkileri olan diğeri yeniden paylaştırıcı özelliği olan iki politik alan seçilmiş ve 
incelenmiştir. 
Bu çalışmanın başlıca bulgaları şunlardır: ilk olarak, Türkiye paylaştırıcı etkileri olan 
AB ulaştırma politikalarının uygulanmasında daha başarılı olmuştur. Đkinci olarak, tam 
üyelik perspektifinin olmadığı durumlarda yeniden paylaştırıcı etkisi olan ulaştırma 
politikalarının senkrenizasyonun da  ise daha az başarılı olmuştur. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 Turkey’s bid for becoming a full member of the European Union (EU) has been 
a long and troublesome process constituting many ups and downs. In October 2012, it 
will be the seventh anniversary of the EU’s momentous decision to start formal 
negotiations with Turkey, which has not shown much progress since the beginning in 
2005. In 2012, no additional chapters of the acquis communautaire, embodiment of 
laws, rules, and regulations of the EU, has been put into process yet. Nineteen chapters 
still remain either frozen or blocked due to unfriendly relations between Turkey and 
some of the EU member states, such as Cyprus and France. The internal fiscal and 
economic crisis within the EU have recently become another decelerator of Turkey’s 
full membership process; due to this crisis, the member states have either lost their 
interests in Turkey, or they have taken a negative stand against Turkey’s full 
membership. However, what is unique in this situation is the fact that Turkey still 
continues its harmonization process in specific policy areas despite its stalling relations. 
 While many argue Turkey’s accession prospects from a general perspective,1 
few note that why Turkey progresses in certain areas of the acquis while stalling in 
others.2 Focusing on transport policy, this thesis asks why Turkey adjust certain EU 
                                                            
1 See for example: Tocci, N. 2005. “Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for 
Reform?,” South European Society and Politics, 10 (1), pp. 73 – 83; Müftüler-Bac, M. 
2005. “Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union,” South 
European Society & Politics, 10(1), pp. 16 – 30; Oğuzlu, T. 2012. “Turkey and the 
European Union: Europeanization Without Membership,” 13(2), pp. 229 – 243.  
 
2 See for example: Ertugal, E. 2011. “Institutional Change and Europeanisation: 
Explaining regional policy reform in Turkey,” Policy & Politic, 39(2), pp. 257-273; 
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policies and technical standards while being reluctant to adopt in others. Therefore, 
being different from other studies, this study mainly focus on adjustment process in 
technical areas compared to political reforms during the accession process. 
 Through this question, this thesis seeks to make a significant contribution to 
Turkey’s accession literature by dwelling on policy specific area, rather than meta-
policy. I do this focusing on transport area since it is very interesting in the agenda of 
the EU. Moreover, transport policy is one of the suspended chapters. Therefore, it is a 
promising field to analyze the differential impacts on domestic politics. And also, this 
policy area fits well into the dominant EU regulatory category which comprises 
distributive, regulative and redistributive characteristics. Another contribution of the 
thesis is to the EU theory perspective. This study suggests a novel theoretical approach 
to the EU studies, at a time and place where the political conjuncture challenges and 
perhaps paralyses existing the EU Europeanization enlargement approaches. 
 In a nutshell, I will argue and present evidence that existing offshoots of 
theoretical framework are at an impasse. I suggest overcoming this by borrowing from 
Public Policy literature developed in the United States. More specifically, I will adapt 
Lowi’s business cycles models. From this I develop a pair of related hypotheses that 
suggest that distributive policies will be more easily adopted than redistributive policies 
in candidate countries. 
 As previously mentioned, I will focus on the Turkish transport policy to test the 
validity of my theoretical suggestions. I will select and process-trace two policy cases, 
one with predominantly distributive implications, and the other with mostly 
redistributive implications. The findings from my case study support my hypothesis: 
Reclaiming impetus between Turkey and the EU will be easier in the harmonization of 
EU acquis with distributive impacts.  
 This thesis is comprised of five chapters. The next chapter gives a broad 
overview of prevalent of theoretical framework that seek to explain the variances in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Kirişci, K. 2011. “Reforming Turkey’s Asylum Policy: Is it Europeanization, UNHCR-
ization or ECHR-ization?” KFG Conference on Faraway, So Close? Reaching beyond 
the Pro/Contra Controversy on Turkey’s EU Accession, 2-4 June, Istanbul, Turkey; 
Nas, Ç. and Özer, Y. 2012. Turkey and the EU: Processes of Europeanisation, 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
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transposition of the EU rules by candidate countries. The chapter starts with the 
describing the current situation in the accession process of Turkey to underlie the 
reasons of variance in the transposition of the EU acquis. To explain this variance, the 
prevalent theoretical approaches will be analyzed and I will discuss to what extent can 
the prevalent theoretical approaches and domestic change account for the differential 
impact of the EU on Turkey.  
 The second part of the chapter will start with an analysis of the EU enlargement 
process. It is important since each enlargement introduces new concepts and the 
theoretical frameworks are built upon these concepts. The enlargement of Central 
Eastern European countries (CEECs) will be deeply analyzed since it brought the 
concepts of Europeanization and conditionality in the center of EU literature. The third 
part of chapter will continue with the introduction of acquis communautaire and its 
impacts on candidate countries will be examined.  
 In the fourth section of chapter I will analyze how far the accession process, as 
an external force, triggers reforms, and leads to internal change. I will also explore 
whether or not Turkey, as a candidate country, fits into the general Europeanization 
theoretical framework in the accession process. In order to answer these questions, I 
will start with an analysis of the theoretical framework of Europeanization. Studies on 
the Europeanization of candidate country situated within three variants of new 
institutionalism, namely rational, sociological or constructivist and historical 
institutionalism. To understand the relationship between Europeanization and new 
institutionalism is important since the latter informs theorizing Europeanization.  
 In the next section, the new institutionalism and its three variants will be 
examined in detail since the models of Europeanization are built upon this framework. 
The three variants of new institutionalism enable to derive distinct modes of the 
mechanism driving the Europeanization of candidate countries. Therefore, in the sixth 
section of chapter, I aim to show under which conditions the Europeanization of non-
member and candidate countries is effective. In other words, which factors explain 
variation in the EU’s influence across countries and issue areas? In order to come up 
with an answer to this question, I examined Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s study on 
candidate countries. Their framework analyses are composed of three models that 
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compare the explanatory power of a rationalist institutionalist “external incentives 
model” with that of sociological institutionalist “social learning model” and a “lesson-
drawing model” emphasizing domestically driven rule adoption. The findings of 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s study show that “external incentive model” is the 
main mechanism which explains the variance in the transposition of the acquis in 
candidate countries. To analyze their findings, I compare both the enlargement of 
CEECs and Turkey in the next two sections of chapters. After analyzing the CEECs 
case, I will turn to the Turkish case in the Europeanization process, which will enable 
me to understand whether Turkey fits well into this theoretical background or not. 
Providing that it does, I will ask which theoretical framework can explain the variances 
in the transposition of the acquis in Turkey.    
 In the third chapter, I will seek to answer why Turkey adjusts certain EU policies 
and technical standards while being reluctant to adopt others by providing a new 
theoretical approach. Before giving my theoretical suggestions, I will first point out the 
basic characteristics of European transport policy to identify areas in which 
convergence between Turkey and the EU is low and high. A brief history of European 
Transport Policy will be examined to define main concepts of the EU Transport Policy. 
Then, in the third section of chapter, the question of why do we need the ex-ante 
categorization of policy areas with respect to their domestic political implications will 
be examined. By depending on this question, the Lowi’s Business Cycle Model will be 
presented to predict specific policy areas where cooperation between Turkey and the 
EU will be promising, and those where achieving cooperation will be a challenging 
task. From this, I develop a pair of related hypotheses that suggest that distributive 
policies will be more easily adopted than redistributive policies in candidate countries.  
In order to test my hypotheses, I select two legislation piece of the EU in transport 
sector.   
 In the fourth chapter, I will analyze two legislation piece of the in transport 
sector to test my hypotheses. The chapter will start with the identification of area 
cooperation between the EU and Turkey. By taking the EU expectations and Turkey’s 
policy preferences into consideration, the case of railway modernization and 
liberalization and the reforms on road haulage will be analyzed by using Lowi’s model. 
The findings of this study will be examined in the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE PREVALENT THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
 
2.1 The Current EU – Turkey Relations 
 
 
 
 Turkey’s journey to become a member of the EU exhibits unique characteristics. 
First of all, Turkey’s accession process has lasted the longest. The relations between 
Turkey and EU started with the 1963 Ankara Agreement. According to this agreement, 
Turkey was recognized as an associate partner and future member of the Community. 
Turkey applied to be a member of the EU in 1987, and has been waiting for joining to 
club ever since. This long and complicated relation between the EU and Turkey enables 
academia to analyze different aspects of the process. This thesis argues that the 
domestic impact of EU accession on Turkey varies from policy to policy across 
different areas of integration. More specifically, it notes that Turkey has successfully 
synchronized some parts of its transport policy while being reluctant to adopt EU acquis 
in others. 
 Quite often, Turkey has experienced its intent to harmonize (some of) EU acquis 
regardless of the political climate that mapped EU-Turkey relations. In perhaps one of 
the most cited remarks, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan indicated in 
2005 that “Turkey should be accepted into the European Union. If not we will change 
the name of the Copenhagen criteria to the Ankara criteria and continue to the 
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reforms.”3 Although the Prime Minister made this speech before the opening accession 
negotiations in 2005, following “Ankara Criteria” has become one of the main 
arguments of Justice and Development Party (AKP) government resorts to when the 
relations between Turkey and the European Union (EU) gets tense.  
 Until 2005, Turkey experienced a reform process under the AKP government 
rule in order to become a member of the EU. In fact, the EU – Turkey relations gained 
significant momentum after the Helsinki Summit of European Council in December 
1999. With the Helsinki Summit, European Council granted Turkey candidacy and 
stated that “Turkey is a candidate country destined to join the EU.”4 In line with 
candidate status, Turkey started to try to align its institutions, legislations and policies 
with the EU acquis. To expedite this transformation process, the Commission prepared 
an Accession Partnership Document for Turkey in 2000. In line with the Accession 
Partnership Document, Turkey prepared and submitted its National Programme for the 
Adoption of the EU acquis in 2001.5 In this direction, the coalition government 
composed of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Motherland Party (ANAP), and the 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) adopted a major Constitutional package that addressed 
the articles on freedom of expression and revised the death penalty with 34 amendments 
to the 1982 Constitution.6 Two more harmonization packages and one civil penal code 
package followed these reforms. The extensive third harmonization packages included 
the abolition of death penalty. It was the last constitutional package of the coalition 
                                                            
3 “Erdogan Copenhagen Criteria would become Ankara criteria.” Journal of Turkish 
Weekly (1 July 2005). Accessed in: http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/14088/erdogan-
copenhagen-criteria-would-become. (20.07.2012). 
 
4 Eliçin, Y. 2011. “The Europeanization of Turkey: Reform in Local Governments,” 
International Journal of Economic and Administrative Studies, Year:4(7), p. 107; 
Müftüler-Bac, M. 2005. “Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the European 
Union,” South European Society & Politics, March 2005, p. 17; Tocci, N. 2005. 
“Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?,” South European Society 
and Politics, 10(1), p: 74. 
 
5 Müftüler-Bac, M. 2005. “Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the European 
Union,” South European Society & Politics, 10(1), pp. 19 -20.  
 
6 Ibid, p. 21.  
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government in August 2001.7 When the AKP took control in the government, the 
reform process accelerated. Between 2002 and 2004, AKP government adopted six 
harmonization packages and New Turkish Penal Code.8 Therefore, at the 2004 Brussels 
summit, the European Council concluded that Turkey had complied sufficiently with 
the Copenhagen political criteria so that the accession process could officially begin on 
3 October 2005. Paradoxically, the membership process of Turkey has since been 
stalled by a number of domestic and external factors.  
 As external factors, the accession process of Turkey has been slowed down 
because of the changing view on Turkish membership. Former accession processes 
clearly show that membership process strongly depends on the support of member 
countries, especially the more populous and economically advanced ones. Germany 
played a critical role in opening negotiations with Turkey in Helsinki summit in 1999. 
However, when Christian Democratic Union (CDU) under Angela Markel came to 
power in Germany, the policy towards Turkey immediately changed after the opening 
of accession negotiations. The economic crises in smaller countries further eroded 
support for Turkey in the EU. Therefore, the views within individual EU member states 
seem to be coming together and hardening into an essentially negative position towards 
Turkey.9  
 On the domestic front, AKP government increasingly showed signs of “reform 
fatigue,” hesitating to push hard for implementation and enforcement of the rights-based 
reforms that it had so assertively legislated previously.10 Therefore, the question of 
whether EU’s political conditionality being lost its credibility over Turkey or not 
become one of the main topics in EU literature. 
                                                            
7 Tocci, N. 2005. “Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?,” South 
European Society and Politics, 10(1), p. 73. 
 
8 Müftüler-Bac, M. 2005. “Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the European 
Union,” South European Society & Politics, 10(1), p. 23. 
 
9 Müftüler-Baç, M. and Mclaren, L. M. 2002. “Enlargement Preferences and Policy – 
Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey,”  European Integration, 25, p. 19; 
Redmond, J. 2007. “Turkey and the European Union: Troubled European or European 
Trouble?”  International Affairs, 83(2),  p. 308. 
 
10 Eliçin, Y. 2011. “The Europeanization of Turkey: Reform in Local Governments,” 
International Journal of Economic and Administrative Studies, Year:4(7), p. 108. 
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 In 2010, Ankara’s policy of creating more lee-way for itself in its 
synchronization efforts with the EU has been formalized with the publication of 
“European Union Strategy for Turkey’s Accession Process” by the Turkey’s Secretariat 
General of EU Affairs.  Report clearly states that: 
“regardless of whether the chapters have been opened, suspended or 
blocked, the objective is to revive the commitments laid down in the 
programme for Alignment with the Acquis that was prepared earlier 
and based on Turkey’s own priorities and timetables, and to keep on the 
agenda the priorities of Turkey’s National Programme for the Adoption 
of the Acquis,  prepared in line with the Accession Partnership.”11 
 
 This statement clearly indicates that Ankara government aims to implement the 
EU acquis, albeit selectively, whether relevant chapters are opened or not. Since Turkey 
rejects to open its ports and airports to traffic from South Cyprus, eight chapters have 
been frozen by the European Council. Eleven others are blocked by France, Greece and 
South Cyprus because of their problematic bilateral relations with Turkey. 
Paradoxically, these adverse circumstances create a unique situation where Turkey can 
choose which parts of the acquis to implement relatively without the pressure of EU 
conditionality and negotiations.  
 That being said, following Ankara criteria is not without political ramifications. 
Such reforms carry various domestic implications. To illustrate, Börzel and Soyaltin 
identifies that reform process has continued with regard to specific policies such as 
minority rights or asylum policy while stalling in some areas such as the Cyprus 
conflict, and Armenian problem.12 However, rather than general policy areas, main 
focus of this study is technical areas. Therefore, this study aims to focus on the domestic 
impact of EU accession on specific policies in Turkey’s accession process.  
 The focus of this paper will be on transport policy to develop a better 
understanding of the variance observed in the harmonization of the EU technical 
                                                            
11  Secretariat General for EU Affairs. 2010. “European Union Strategy for Turkey’s 
Accession Process.” January 2010, Ankara. 
 
12 Börzel, A. T. and Soyaltin D. 2012. “Europeanization in Turkey: Stretching a 
Concept to its Limits?” KFG Working Paper Series, No. 36, p. 6. 
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requirements. Three main reasons underlie this selection decision. Firstly, transport 
policy is one of the suspended chapters. Therefore, it is a promising field to analyze the 
differential impacts on domestic politics. Secondly, this policy area fits well into the 
dominant EU regulatory category which comprises distributive, regulative and 
redistributive characteristics. Thirdly, different subsections – maritime, air, road, and 
rail – give a diverse set of observations to test my hypotheses.  
 To develop expectations regarding the variance observed in the harmonization of 
different policy areas, I will first give an account of the Europeanization of domestic 
public policy in the field of transport sector in Turkey. Then, I will discuss to what 
extent can the prevalent theoretical approaches of Europeanization and domestic change 
account for the differential impact of the EU on Turkey. This discussion will lead me to 
introduce a new theoretical framework, namely Lowi’s (1964) theory on issue areas.  
 
 
 
2.2 EU Enlargement and Europeanization 
 
 
Enlargement is one of the key policy areas of the EU.13 It has become a policy 
tool for governing relations with EU’s close neighbor countries. Therefore, enlargement 
is a permanent and continuous item on the EU agenda.14 Indeed, since the foundation of 
the EU, enlargement has been on the top agenda of the EU. Article 237 of the 1957 
Treaty of Rome clearly states that “any European state may apply to become member of 
the Community.” Therefore, this clause left an open door to be a member of the club. 
During its lifespan from 1952 to 2012, the EU grew from six15 to 27 member states. 
Until the end of Cold War, each enlargement in 1973 (the UK, Denmark and Ireland), 
1981 (Greece), 1986 (Spain and Portugal), and 1995 (Sweden, Austria and Finland) has 
                                                            
13 Schimmelfening, F. and Sedelmeier, U. 2002. “Theorezing EU enlargement: research 
focus, hypotheses, and the state of research,” Journal of European Public Policy,  
August 2002, p. 500. 
  
14  Peterson, J. and Jones E. 1999. “Decision-making in an enlarging European Union.” 
In: James Sperling (ed.), Two Tiers or Two Speeds: The European security order and 
the enlargement of the EU.  Manchester, Manchester University Press, p. 25. 
 
15 Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg are the founding 
member of the EU. 
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been the result of ad hoc individual negotiations and as a series of compromises 
designed to accommodate the specific needs and requirements of both the EU’s and the 
applicant states’ evolving needs.16  
 With the end of Cold War, the European Union encountered with a new 
dynamics in enlargement process. Both the collapse of the bipolar order and the fall of 
Soviet Union considerably affected the process of European integration.17 The 
transformation of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and the aspiration of 
these countries to join the EU introduced new challenges to the EU. Since these 
countries were excluded from any initiatives of European integration for 50 years, the 
existence of differences between two sides constituted significant hurdles. Under these 
circumstances, CEECs were not ready to be part of the Union as long as they did not 
have efficient market and democratic system. Therefore, misfit and the concept of 
conditionality emerged as a key element to transform these countries. At the meeting of 
the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993, the Copenhagen criteria were introduced 
to deal with the immanent enlargement problems. The criteria were set to establish clear 
benchmarks against which a large number of candidates would be evaluated towards 
their accession. As such, these criteria aimed at establishing effective democratic 
institutions, respect for human and minority rights and install market economy in the 
countries. Through such criteria, EU membership became one of the foreign policy 
cards of the EU. With the help of Copenhagen Criteria, the EU aimed to bring these 
countries to EU’s democratic and economic standards. Upon meeting the criteria, the 
first group of candidates was able to open the accession negotiations in 1998. Ten new 
countries completed negotiations in 2002 and joined the EU on 1 May 2004, bringing 
the member-state tally to 25. With the memberships of Romania and Bulgaria, the EU’s 
membership grew to twenty-seven. Croatia is on the schedule to be a member in 2013. 
Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey are official candidates of the EU 
which are waiting for joining to the club. The remaining countries of the Western 
                                                            
16 Burgess, M. 2009. “Federalism.” In: Antje Wiener and Thomaz Diez (eds.), 
European Integration Theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 40.  
 
17 Rosamond, B. 2000. Theories of European Integration(European Union Series). 
Palgrave Macmillan, p.  45.  
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Balkans that are covered by the Stabilization and Association process launched in 
1999.18  
 
2.3 EU Enlargement and Transposition 
 
 Historical developments in EU enlargement have introduced a new foreign 
policy tool to the EU that its political conditionality has become the strongest external 
factor for political change in countries aspiring for membership.19 Related with the 
conditionality, “Europeanization” has become one of the fashionable concepts in the EU 
literature. More than Copenhagen Criteria, any candidate country has to implement the 
acquis communautaire, or simply referred to as “the acquis,” which is defined as “the 
body of common rights and obligations which bind all the member states together 
within the EU.”20 In order to achieve a progress in the membership negotiations, the EU 
expects to see a progress in the implementation of the acquis by the candidate country. 
Starting the accession negotiations, the Commission gives a candidate country certain 
reform tasks that are framed in the acquis. For the purpose of screening and subsequent 
negotiations, the acquis is broken down into a number of chapters, each covering 
specific policy areas.21 In order to become a member state, the candidate country has to 
                                                            
18Schimmelfenning, F. and Sedelmeier, U. 2007. “Candidate Countries and 
Conditionality.” In:Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Wink (eds.), Europeanization: New 
Research Agendas, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 88. 
 
19 Müftüler-Bac, M. 2005. “Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the European 
Union,” South European Society & Politics, 10(1), p. 18.  
 
20 European Commission. 2000. Glossary: Institutions, Policies, and Enlargement of the 
European Union. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications, 2000. 
 
21 Currently Turkey does have 35 chapters to screen and complement them: “Free 
movement of goods,” “freedom of movement for workers,” “right of establishment and 
freedom to provide services,” “free movement of capital,” “public procurement,” 
“company law,” “intellectual property law,” “competition policy,” “financial services, 
information society and media,” “agriculture and rural development,”  “food safety, 
veterinary and phytosanitary policy,” “fisheries,” “transport policy,” “taxation,” 
“economic and monetary policy,”  “statistics,” “social policy and employment,” 
“enterprise and industrial policy,” “Trans-European networks,” “regional policy and 
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transpose these rules into domestic law.22 Within this context, Europeanization emerges 
as a key concept that defines under what circumstances both member states and 
candidate countries transpose acquis communautaire into their national legislation. 
Since this thesis dwells on the impact of Europeanization on candidate states, I will 
analyze how far the accession process, as an external force, triggers harmonization of 
EU acquis, and leads to internal change. I will also explore whether or not Turkey, as a 
candidate country, fits into the general Europeanization theoretical framework in the 
accession process. In order to answer these questions, I will start with an analysis of the 
theoretical framework of Europeanization. Then, I will turn to the Turkish case in the 
Europeanization process, which will enable me to understand whether Turkey fits well 
into this theoretical background or not. Providing that it does, I will ask which 
theoretical framework can explain the accession process of Turkey.  
 
 
2.4 Europeanization: Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 Johan Olsen describes the research on Europeanization as a “growth industry.”23 
Various factors can be shown as the reasons for the increasing popularity. Vertical and 
horizontal integration process in the EU is one of the main factors. Driven by the 
dynamism in the integration process from the Single European Market, through the 
development of Economic and Monetary Union and other policy areas, researchers of 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
coordination of structural instruments,” “judiciary and fundamental rights,” “justice, 
freedom and security,” “science and research,” “education and culture,” “environment,”  
“consumer and health protection,” “Customs union,” “external relations,” “foreign, 
security and defence policy,” “financial control,” “financial and budgetary provisions,” 
 “institutions,” and “other issues.”  
 
22 For more information,  Europa website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_c
ountry_join_the_eu/negotiations_croatia_turkey/index_en.htm.  
 
23 Olsen, J. P. 2002. “The Many Faces of Europeanization,” Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Volume 40(5), p. 921.  
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the EU have been confronted with explaining the EU’s subsequent impact upon the 
member states, accession states and near-neighbors.24 Therefore, studies of the impact 
ranges from the specific policy areas to member states. Since this concept covers 
extensive areas, the need for developing a theoretical framework becomes necessary. 
Before building the theoretical framework on Europeanization, the definition of concept 
needs to be identified to narrow down the area.  
 Radaelli defines Europeanization as a “process of construction, diffusion and 
institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 
‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the making of EU decision and then incorporated in the logic of 
domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.”25 Since the 
definition of Europeanization depends upon the different processes in European level, 
Olsen identifies five categories of Europeanization. Firstly, Europeanization is used in 
connection with changes in external boundaries of Europe, mainly through the 
enlargement. The accession process of CEECs is a good example of this definition. 
Secondly, he identifies Europeanization as building institutions and developing norms at 
the European level. This usage is about the governance of the EU. Thirdly, 
Europeanization is defined as a term covering the “central penetration of national 
systems of governance.” This definition considers adaptation of national and sub-
national systems of governance to European institutions and norms.  Fourthly, 
Europeanization is used as a term covering the “exporting the forms of political 
organization.” This definition contextualizes Europe into international system through 
exporting its values to states or regions. A final usage is Europeanization as “a political 
unification project.”26 In a simple manner, Olsen’s typology is based on the transfer 
                                                            
24 Bulmer,S. 2007.  “Theorizing Europeanization.”  In:Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. 
Wink (eds.), Europeanization: New Research Agendas, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 46. 
 
25Radaelli, C.M. 2000. “Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive 
change,” European Integration Online Papers, 4(8), p. 4.  
 
26
 Olsen, J. P. 2002. “The Many Faces of Europeanization,” Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Volume 40(5), pp. 923 – 924; Bulmer,S. 2007.  “Theorizing Europeanization.”  
In:Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Wink (eds.), Europeanization: New Research 
Agendas, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 46; Quaglia et all. 2007. “Europeanization.” In 
Michelle Cini (ed.), European Union Politics.  Oxford University Press, New York.  
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from the EU to other subjects and building European capacity. Related with the subject 
of topic, the Europeanization is confined with the Olsen’s first definition in this study. 
 The Europeanization of candidate countries has emerged only recently as a 
separate research area. Originally research on “Europeanization” was concerned almost 
exclusively with domestic change in the EU member states.27 As it is mentioned in the 
second part of the chapter, the developments during the accession process of CEECs 
extricate the Europeanization of candidate counties as a particular sub-field of 
Europeanization research.28  
 Two main characteristics of CEECs case specified the Europeanization studies 
on candidate countries as a sub-field of Europeanization research. Firstly, the EU 
institutions can not apply its regular tools to influence adjustment process because of the 
status of candidates as non-members. However, they use alternative tools such as 
positive incentives, normative pressure and persuasion to accelerate the process. Second 
factor which make Europeanization studies on candidate country as a specific sub-field 
is related with the top-down process of rule transfer. Sedelmeier points out that since 
candidate countries had no voice in the formation of rules, the power asymmetry vis-à-
                                                            
27 See for example: Duina, Franceso. 1997. “Explaining Legal Implementation in the 
European Union,” International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 25, pp. 155 – 179; 
Knill, Christoph. 1998.  “European Politics: The Impact of National Administrative 
Traditions,” Journal of Public Policy, 18, pp. 1 – 28; Kaeding, Michael. 2008. “Lost in 
Translation or Full Steam Ahead: the Transposition of EU Transport Directives across 
Member States,” European Union Politics, 9(1), pp. 115 – 143; König, Thomas and 
Brooke Luetgert. 2009. “Troubles with Transposition? Explaining Trends in Member-
State Notification and the Delayed Transposition of EU Directives,” British Journal of 
Political Science, 39, pp. 163 – 194. 
  
28
 See for example: Grabbe, Heather. 2001. “How does Europeanization affect CEE 
governance? Conditionality, diffusion, and diversity,” Journal of European Public 
Policy, 8(6), pp. 1013 – 1031; Schimmelfenning, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier. 2005. 
“Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe,” in 
The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, (Eds) Schimmelfenning, Frank 
and Ulrich Sedelmeier, pp. 1 – 28, Cornell University Press, New York; 
Schimmelfenning, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier. 2005. The Europeanization of Central 
and Eastern Europe. Cornell Studies in Political Economy, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, New York. 
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vis the incumbents has led to top-down process of rule transfer, with no scope for 
uploading their own preferences to the EU level.29 
 Therefore, the question of how far Europeanization on candidate countries can 
be effective when these two unique characteristics are taken into consideration. Which 
factors explain the variance in the adjustments of EU requirements in specific policy 
areas? In order to find the answer these questions, the studies on this field have 
dramatically increased.  
 The increasing number of studies on the subject matured the Europeanization of 
candidate countries as a research area. Accordingly, studies have become more 
systematic. After the accession of CEECs, the analysis of the EU’s impact on accession 
countries started to be based on conceptual framework which can be applied to other 
cases.30 These studies have made considerable contribution to the development of a 
common research agenda for the Europeanization of candidate states. They share 
considerable common ground, both with regard to their analytical frameworks and 
empirical findings. Their main aim is to find in which conditions non-EU member states 
adopt EU rules. Their framework of analysis is situated within three variants of new 
institutionalism, namely rational, sociological or constructivist and historical 
institutionalism.31 To understand the relationship between Europeanization and new 
institutionalism is important since the latter informs theorizing Europeanization.32 
                                                            
29 Sedelmeier, U. 2011. “Europeanization in new member and candidate states,” Living 
Reviews in European Governance, 6(1), p. 6. 
 
30 See for example: Schimmelfenning, F. and Sedelmeier U. 2005. “Introduction: 
Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe,” in The 
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, (Eds) Schimmelfenning, Frank and 
Ulrich Sedelmeier, Cornell University Press, New York; Schimmelfenning, F. and 
Sedelmeier U. 2005. The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. Cornell 
Studies in Political Economy, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York. 
 
31 Pollack, Mark A. 2009. “The New Institutionalisms and European Integration.” In 
Antje Wiener and Thomaz Diez (eds.), European Integration Theory (Second Edition), 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 139. 
 
32 Bulmer,S. 2007.  “Theorizing Europeanization.”  In:Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. 
Wink (eds.), Europeanization: New Research Agendas, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 50. 
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2.5 The New Institutionalisms and EU Enlargement 
 
 
 Theoretically, most of the recent works in European integration is embedded in 
new institutionalism. New institutionalism aims to elucidate the role that institutions 
play in the determination of social and political outcomes while institutions are the rules 
of the game in a society and the humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction.33 It is called as new institutionalism since the role of institutions on political 
had been neglected by the core body of theories – behaviorism, pluralism, Marxism and 
neo-realism − especially during the 1950s and 1970s.34 Three primary institutionalisms 
developed during the course of the 1980s and early 1990s. According to March and 
Olsen, institutions are not simple and passive bodies within political process, they are 
the main bodies with provide contexts where actors can conduct a relatively higher 
proportion of positive sum bargains.35  
 Although the new institutionalisms in political science were born in the field of 
EU studies, it has been applied with increasing frequency and success to the study of the 
Union as a polity and to European integration as a process. With the developments 
within the theory, the New Institutionalism evolves into plural institutionalisms which 
are rational choice, sociological and historical variants. Each of them provides 
distinctive sets of hypotheses and insights about the EU.36 During the membership 
                                                            
33 Gwiazda, Anna. 2002. “Europeanisation in Candidate Countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe,” Paper prepared for the EPIC workshop in Florence, EUI, 19 – 22 
September 2002,  p. 7. 
 
34 Pollack, Mark A. 2009. “The New Institutionalisms and European Integration.” In 
Antje Wiener and Thomaz Diez (eds.), European Integration Theory (Second Edition), 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 125. 
 
35 March, J. G. And Olsen, J. P. 1984. “The New Institutionalism: Organizational 
Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review, p. 78. 
 
36 Ibid. 
 17 
 
process of CEECs, this theoretical framework is embedded into Europeanization of 
candidate countries. 
 
 
2.5.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism 
 
 Rational choice institutionalism sees the institutions as formal legalistic entities 
and sets of decision rules that impose obligations upon self-interested political actors.37 
Actors preferences are shaped within this institutional venue and actors take these 
preferences in the pursuit of their self-interests. Within this context, institutions 
constrain self-interested action of actors by defining the strategies that political actors 
adopt in the pursuit of their self-interest.38According to this approach, institutions are 
created by states since states see benefits of having institutions to achieve their political 
goals in international arena.39 Therefore, rational actors engage in strategic interactions 
using their resources to maximize their utilities. In this respect, the EU facilitates 
domestic change through changing opportunity structures for domestic actors.40  
 The system of Europeanization works in two steps according to rational choice 
approach. Firstly, the misfit between the EU and domestic norms creates demands for 
domestic adoption. Secondly, the implementation of EU policies and institutions by 
candidate countries is embodied by cost/benefit calculations of strategic actors.41 The 
                                                            
37 Rosamond, B. 2000. Theories of European Integration.  London, Macmillan Press 
Ltd. p. 115. 
 
38 Ibid, p. 116; Gwiazda, Anna. 2002. “Europeanisation in Candidate Countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe,” Paper prepared for the EPIC workshop in Florence, EUI, 
19 – 22 September 2002,  p.  8. 
 
39 Keohane, R. O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy. New Jersey, Princeton University Press, p. 55.  
 
40 Knill, C. and Lehmkuhl, D. 2002. “The national impact of European Union regulatory 
policy: Three Europeanization mechanisms,” European Journal of Political Research, 
41(2), p. 269. 
 
41 Börzel, A. T. and Soyaltin D. 2012. “Europeanization in Turkey: Stretching a 
Concept to its Limits?” KFG Working Paper Series, No. 36, p. 6. 
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actions of rational actors are limited or enabled by the institutions which render some 
options more costly than others. From this aspect, rational actors perceive 
Europeanization as an emerging political opportunity structure that enables to some 
actors additional resources to present influence while constraining the ability of others 
to pursue their aims.42 Domestic change becomes available if the EU incentive is strong 
enough to overcome resistance of veto players against to EU requirements. 
Accordingly, credible incentives of the EU can also empower domestic reform 
coalitions over the opposition by providing them with additional resources to benefit the 
opportunities offered by Europeanization.43  
 
 
2.5.2 Sociological (Constructivist) Institutionalism 
 
 Contrary to rational institutionalists, sociological institutionalism 
(constructivists) emphasize on the cognitive dimension of institutions. According to 
Hall and Taylor (1996), “sociological institutionalists stress on the way in which 
institutions influence behavior by providing the cognitive scripts, categories and models 
that are indispensable for action, not least because without them the world and the 
behavior of others cannot be interpreted.”44 Therefore, they are concerned with the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
42 Ibid, p. 8. 
43Further studies on rational choice approch: Börzel, A. Tanja and Digdem Soyaltin. 
2012. “Europeanization in Turkey: Stretching a Concept to its Limits?” KFG Working 
Paper Series, No. 36, p. 8; Gwiazda, Anna. 2002. “Europeanisation in Candidate 
Countries from Central and Eastern Europe.” Paper prepared for the EPIC workshop in 
Florence, EUI, 19 – 22 September 2002, p. 8; Simon Bulmer. 2007.  “Theorizing 
Europeanization.”  In:Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Wink (eds.), Europeanization: 
New Research Agendas, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 50; Pollack, Mark A. 2009. “The New 
Institutionalisms and European Integration,” in European Integration Theory (Second 
Edition), (Eds) Wiener, Antje and Thomas Diez, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 
139; Schimmelfenning, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier. 2007. “Candidate Countries and 
Conditionality.” In:Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Wink (eds.), Europeanization: New 
Research Agendas, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 90. 
 
44 Hall, P. And Taylor, R.C.R. 1996. “Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms,” Political Studies, 44(5), p. 948.  
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realm of norms, ideas, discourse, organizational culture and the psychology of politics.45 
In this respect, collectively shared understandings of what constitutes proper, socially 
accepted behavior guides actors. As differently from rational institutionalism, actors 
seek to meet social expectations in a given situation instead of maximizing their egoistic 
self-interest. From this point, Europeanization is perceived as the emergence of new 
rules, norms and structures of meaning to which candidate countries are exposed and 
which they have to transpose into domestic rule structures.46 Börzel and Soyaltin define 
the process of transposition of EU rules as follows: 
“If there is such a misfit, it also takes agency to bring about domestic 
change. However, the ways in which domestic actors engage with 
reforms are different. Norm entrepreneurs such as epistemic 
communities or advocacy networks socialize domestic actors into new 
norms and rules of appropriateness through persuasion and learning, a 
process through which they redefine their interests and identities 
accordingly. The more active norm entrepreneurs and EU allies are 
and the more they succeed in making EU policies resonate with 
domestic norms and beliefs, the more successful they will be in bringing 
about domestic change. Moreover, collective understandings of 
appropriate behavior strongly influence the ways in which domestic 
actors download EU requirements. For example, a consensus oriented 
or cooperative decision-making culture helps to overcome multiple veto 
points by rendering their use for actors inappropriate. Such consensus 
oriented political culture allows for a sharing of adaptational costs 
which facilitates the accommodation of pressure for adaptation.”47 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
45 Bulmer,S. 2007.  “Theorizing Europeanization.”  In:Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. 
Wink (eds.), Europeanization: New Research Agendas, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 50. 
 
46 Börzel, A. T. and Soyaltin D. 2012. “Europeanization in Turkey: Stretching a Concept 
to its Limits?” KFG Working Paper Series, No. 36, p. 8. 
 
47 Ibid. 
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Therefore, sociological institutionalists claim that international social learning and the 
diffusion of legitimate norms play a central role in transtion of candidate countries.48 
 
2.5.3 Historical Institutionalism 
 
 Historical institutionalist perspective is another important variant which is used 
in the studies of Europeanization for both member and candidate states. Historical 
institutionalists mainly argue that institutions can shape the goals and the preferences of 
actors.49 They are concerned with the role of time in the integration process. The path-
dependent nature of national institutions and national policies is one of the subject 
matter areas of this approach. The variation in the acceptance and transposition of EU 
norms by candidate countries is also analyzed by historical institutionalism approach.50 
According to this approach, path dependent processes continue irrespective of whether 
the initial decision still makes sense, and explains why actors stick to their guns even 
though their short term instrumental interests might have changed.51 Therefore, the 
Europeanization in candidate countries is related with the past experience and also the 
structure of institutions.  
                                                            
48 See for example: Börzel, Tanja A. and Thomas Risse. 2000. “When Europe Hits 
Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change,” European Integration online Papes 
(EIoP), Vol. 4; Checkel, J. 2005. “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: 
Introduction and Framework,” International Organization,  59(4), pp. 801 – 826; 
Epstein, R. 2005. “Diverging Effects of Social Learning and External Incentives in 
Polish Central Banking and Agricultre.” In Schimmelfenning, F and Sedelmeier , U. 
(eds) The Europeanization of Central Eastern Europe, New York, Cornell University 
Press, pp. 178 – 198; Gheciu, A. 2005. NATO in the ‘New Europe’: The Politics of 
International Socialization after the Cold War. Stanford, Stanford University Press. 
 
49 Rosamond, B. 2000. Theories of European Integration.  London, Macmillan Press 
Ltd. p. 116. 
 
50 Pollack, Mark A. 2009. “The New Institutionalisms and European Integration.” In 
Antje Wiener and Thomaz Diez (eds.), European Integration Theory (Second Edition), 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 139. 
 
51 Müftüler-Baç, M. And Mclaren, L. M. 2002. “Enlargement Preferences and Policy – 
Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey,”  European Integration, 25, p. 21.   
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 The three different variants of new institutionalism enable to derive distinct 
models of the mechanism driving the Europeanization of the candidate states. By using 
these models, researches aims to find out under which conditions the Europeanization of 
non-member and candidate countries is effective. In other words, which factors explain 
variation in the EU’s influence across countries and issue areas? 
 
 
2.6 Models of Europeanization 
 
 
 As institutionalism approaches provide a highly promising framework to 
structure the research agenda on candidate country Europeanization, most theoretically 
– informed studies of the Europeanization of candidate countries are generally set 
within the framework of institutionalist theory.52 However, these studies differ among 
each other in response to their models. While some models focus on the use of 
conditionality which is the strategy of rational choice institutionalism, other constructs 
their model on persuasion and socialization strategies that sociological 
institutionalism.53 By making comparison between two approaches, they seek to find 
solution. Within these conceptual framework analyses, Frank Schimmelfennig and 
Ulrich Sedelmeier’s findings are the most accurate one since they explicitly seek to test 
                                                            
52 See for example, Bauer et al. 2007. “Differential Europeanization in Eastern Europe: 
The Impact of Diverse EU Regulatory Governance Patterns,” Journal of European 
Integration, 29(4), pp. 405 – 423: Dimitrova, Antoaneta L. 2002.  Driven to Change: 
The European Union’s Enlargement Viewed from the East. Manchester University 
Press, Manchester; Epstein, R. 2005. “Diverging Effects of Social Learning and 
External Incentives in Polish Central Banking and Agricultre.” In Schimmelfenning, F 
and Sedelmeier , U. (eds) The Europeanization of Central Eastern Europe, New York, 
Cornell University Press, pp. 178 – 198; Goetz, Klaus H. 2002. “Europeanization in 
West and East: A Challenge to Institutional Theory,” 1st Pan-European Conference on 
EU Politics, Bordeaux, 26 -28 September2002, conference paper; Grabbe, Heather. 
2006. The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in 
Central and Eastern Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, New York. 
 
53 Sedelmeier, U. 2011. “Europeanization in new member and candidate states,” Living 
Reviews in European Governance, 6(1), p. 11. 
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alternative rationalist and constructivist hypotheses about the effect of EU 
membership.54 It is important to point out that their conceptual framework analysis is 
built upon CEECs’ cases. The question needs to be answered that how far their 
conceptual framework can explain the variance in Turkish case? At the end of this 
chapter, I will seek to answer this question. 
 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier study is composed of three 
models which compare the explanatory power of a rationalist institutionalist “external 
incentives model” with that of sociological institutionalist “social learning model” and a 
“lesson-drawing model” emphasizing domestically driven rule adoption.55  
 
 
2.6.1 External Incentive Model 
 
 External incentive model is derived from rational choice models of bargaining, 
focusing on the asymmetrical bargaining power of the EU and its applicant states and in 
particular on EU “conditionality.” According to this model, conditionality is the 
dominant mechanism of Europeanization in accession countries that variance in 
Europeanization outcomes can largely attributed to conditions of effective 
conditionality bargaining. In order to achieve effective conditionality bargaining, some 
conditions need to be met. First of all, interdependence between the EU and candidate 
countries should favor the EU. Candidate country must depend on the EU market. 
Therefore, the possibility of being member of the EU should promise higher benefits to 
candidate country. In this way, the EU can use its superior bargaining power to 
influence candidate country if its conditions have not been met by candidate country. In 
                                                            
54Schimmelfenning, F. and Sedelmeier, U. 2005. “Introduction: Conceptualizing the 
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe,” in The Europeanization of Central and 
Eastern Europe, (eds.) Schimmelfenning, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier, Cornell 
University Press, New York, pp. 1 – 28.  
 
55 Schimmelfenning, F. and Ulrich S. 2007. “Candidate Countries and Conditionality.” 
In:Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Wink (eds.), Europeanization: New Research 
Agendas, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 90. 
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other words, the “golden carrot” should be big enough to draw candidate countries 
closer to Europe.56 Secondly, the credibility of incentives is another important factor to 
achieve effective conditionality bargaining. It directly influences the cost-benefit 
calculations of candidate countries. The credibility of rewards can easily be affected by 
EU-intra politics. For example, political conflicts inside the EU can make candidates 
doubt that the EU will deliver the promised rewards. Moreover, the credibility also 
suffers when the EU discriminates some candidate countries by rewarding membership 
although they did not meet all the requirements (the start of negotiations with Bulgaria, 
Romania).57 Although the credibility of incentive is easily damaged, it can be re-fixed 
once accession negotiations starts with candidate countries. The cases of CEECs show 
that the rule adoption increased dramatically once these countries achieved candidate 
status by the EU. Thirdly, the EU’s salience on some specific areas is one of the key 
factors in rendering the EU’s conditionality credible. Therefore, the rule adoption in that 
area automatically increases.58 During the enlargement process, EU member states and 
the Commission give more weight to certain policy areas in their enlargement decisions. 
For example, CEECs knew that the EU institutions directly monitor the adoption of 
Schengen rules the compliance to which was a key condition for membership.59 
Therefore, the EU’s effective conditionality bargaining is high in these specific policies. 
Lastly, domestic politics of candidate countries is another important variable that 
influence the EU’s effectiveness. If there is absence or weakness of veto players in 
candidate country, the main potential domestic obstacle to effective conditionality 
would be removed. However, the EU still needs to have domestic allies in target 
countries to have effective conditionality bargaining since domestic costs of adopting 
                                                            
56 Sedelmeier, U. 2011. “Europeanization in new member and candidate states,” Living 
Reviews in European Governance, 6(1), p. 12. 
 
57 Ibid. 
 
58 Schimmelfenning, F. and Ulrich S. 2007. “Candidate Countries and Conditionality.” 
In:Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Wink (eds.), Europeanization: New Research 
Agendas, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 93. 
 
59 Ibid. 
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rules can cause a problem in the implementation of EU rules.60 Here, Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier (2007) differentiate the impact of conditionality on candidate countries 
according to its context as democratic conditionality and acquis conditionality. In the 
context of democratic conditionality, the measurement of Europeanization impacts is 
made according to the adoption of democratic and human rights norms. In other words, 
the reform process in general policy area is the main focus. In the context of acquis 
conditionality, Europeanization effects are measured by the adjustments of specific 
policies’ rules as a result of EU conditionality in countries outside the EU.61 While 
adjustment costs and domestic veto players play a decisive role in the case of 
democratic conditionality, these costs do not play an important role in individual policy 
areas.62 According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2007), the governments 
generally fear that the costs of rule adoption in political system (such as civilian control 
over the military) can cause to a loss of office. However, costs in individual policy areas 
can be discounted against the benefits of EU membership. Hence, these factors 
influence the EU’s impact on the accession country according to ‘external incentive 
model’. Under these circumstances, a general proposition of external incentive model 
can be made: if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the domestic adoption costs, a state 
adopts the rule.63 
 
 
2.6.2 Social Learning Model 
 
                                                            
60 Sedelmeier, U. 2011. “Europeanization in new member and candidate states,” Living 
Reviews in European Governance, 6(1), p. 14. 
 
61 Schimmelfenning, F. and Ulrich S. 2007. “Candidate Countries and Conditionality.” 
In:Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Wink (eds.), Europeanization: New Research 
Agendas, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 91 – 92.  
62 Ibid, p. 91. 
 
63 Schimmelfenning, F. and Sedelmeier U. 2004. “Governance by conditionality: EU 
rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” Journal of 
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 As opposed to “external incentive model,” Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
introduced “social learning” and “lesson-drawing” models which are derived from 
sociological institutionalism. ‘Social learning model’ is one of the core tenets of social 
constructivism. In contrast to the rationalist model of conditionality, the social learning 
model assumes logic of appropriateness. In regards to this approach, the main 
motivations of actors are internalized norms, values and identities. Instead of bargaining 
about conditions and rewards, this approach argues about the legitimacy of rules and 
appropriateness of behavior. Rather than coercion, persuasion is the main tool for the 
transfer of rules.64  
 In this perspective, the EU is defined by a specific collective identity and a 
specific set of common values and norms. Whether a non-member state adopts EU rules 
depends on the degree to which it regards EU rules and its demands for rule adoption as 
appropriate in light of these collective identity and norms.65 Therefore a general 
proposition of the social learning model can be drown as: a state adopts EU rules if it is 
persuaded of the appropriateness of EU rules.66 The legitimacy of the EU rule is one 
factor which affects the persuasion of it. If substantive rules are codified in the EU’s 
own acquis, they are more likely to be perceived as legitimate.67 
 
2.6.3 Lesson Drawing Model 
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 The lesson drawing model is another alternative model to external incentive 
model. It basically argues that non-member states adopt EU rules without EU incentives 
or persuasion. It is about domestic dissatisfaction with current rules and norms. Policy 
makers review policies and rules in operation elsewhere and make a prospective 
evaluation of their transferability. A state adopts EU rule if it is expects these rules to 
solve domestic policy problems effectively.68 
 The findings of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier which is based on a series of 
case studies cutting across multiple countries and multiple issue-areas provide support 
for external incentive model when the CEECs cases are taken into consideration. 
Although two alternative models are partly competing, partly complementary 
explanations, they are not dominant model that explains the variance. Moreover, since 
“social learning model” is based on norms and values, it does not explain the 
adjustments in technical areas. Norms and values mainly play role in the general 
reforms in social-political arena, but not in technical areas. Therefore, observed 
variations in rule adjustments are explained in large part by a credible membership 
perspective and clear political conditionality. Therefore, credible political 
conditionality is the most important source of EU leverage and policy change in 
candidate countries while socialization and lesson drawing have a much weaker and 
more variable impact.69 In the next section, the findings of ‘external incentive model’ 
will be analyzed in CEECs case in order to compare with the case of Turkey.  
 
 
2.7 The Case of Central Eastern European Countries 
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 The membership process of Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) began 
with the first manifestation of Euro-enthusiasm from the new born independent 
countries (particularly Poland and Hungary) in the early 1990s. When the EU officially 
set out its definition of EU membership criteria in response to CEECs request to join the 
club, the process officially started in June 1993. In March and April 1994, Hungary and 
Poland applied and then were followed by Slovakia, Romania, Estonia, Bulgaria, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic.70 With the official application for 
the EU membership, the transformation of these countries accelerated in the democratic 
conditionality area. Once the EU announced that they met with Copenhagen criteria, the 
negotiations began with first six countries (Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovenia) in 1998 and further six (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Romania and Slovakia) began to negotiate EU entry in 2000.71  
 The accession of CEECs case shows that the key condition for the success of EU 
rule transfer is whether the EU sets its rules as conditions for countries with credible 
membership perspective. Before EU’s conditionality was spelled out, transposition of 
EU enactments was rather patch and selective. However, once the given area became 
the subject of EU conditionality, the transposition of EU rules into national legislation 
dramatically increased.72 Therefore, the external incentive model of Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier is highly successful in explaining rule transfer in CEECs. 
 Once accession negotiations start with candidate countries, the credibility that 
the EU will reward rule adoption with membership emerges as the most important 
factor influencing the cost-benefit calculations of CEEC governments. Political 
developments in CEECs shows that reinforcement by reward was strong enough to 
overcome the resistance of veto players against the substantial costs entailed in 
compliance with the adoption of acquis communautaire. Therefore, adjustment costs 
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and veto player did not play decisive role in these countries since adjustment costs in 
individual policy areas are discounted against the benefits of membership in CEECs.73 
According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, adjustment costs and veto player just 
explain variation in the speed of rule adoption across issue areas and countries, not the 
systematic variation in the likelihood of rule adoption as such.74 For example in the area 
of environmental policy, the harmonization of control and command instruments in 
Czech Republic was only made once the EU’s conditionality set in.75  
 Lastly, the Eastern enlargement reveals that EU’s political priority area affects 
the transposition of EU rules. In other words, the salience that the EU attaches to a 
particular area appears as a key factor that renders the EU’s conditionality credible, and 
therefore increases the success of rule transfer.76 For example, in the area of Schengen 
rules, candidate countries know that it was a key condition for membership since EU 
actors clearly defines it. In sum, in the area of acquis conditionality, a credible 
membership perspective and the setting of rules as conditions are the main elements 
which explain variance in the EU influence and across countries.  
 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier do not eliminate the importance of alternative 
models in the explaining of variance in the implementation of EU rules in candidate 
countries. While rationalist mechanism of ‘differential empowerment through 
conditionality’ dominates accession Europeanization, social learning and lesson 
drawing models play role. During the enlargement of CEECs, the impact of strong 
domestic consensus to join the EU was very influential. Therefore, the domestic veto 
players inside and outside government could not react the reform process in an opposite 
way. Since the most part of CEECs society see themselves as part of the EU, EU rules 
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are easily adopted. Moreover, the lesson drawing model explains which specific rules 
the CEECs adopt or how they interpret and use these rules. If the specific policies and 
rules of the EU are good for domestic country, the transposition of them becomes much 
easier than others.77 Furthermore, these models explain cases which included the 
adoption of EU policies without EU adjustment pressures or the internalization of EU 
rules by actors in the candidate countries even if the policies were initially adopted 
instrumentally.78 However, these alternative models are limited in the explanation. It is 
hard to prove that there is a direct relation between the legitimacy of EU rules and 
conditions with EU impact on rule adoption in the candidate country.  
 In sum, external incentive model did fairly a good job in accounting the 
differential impact of accession on the Central and Eastern Europe. In the case of 
CEECs, the model works well, since there was a credible membership perspective and 
clear political conditionality. And also, these factors were also supported by the 
conditions such as asymmetrical dependence or absence of veto player. For this reason, 
the Europeanization process of CEECs is explained well by the model of 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier.  The question is that this model can be generalized to 
other cases, such as Turkey? How far the existing approaches of Europeanization and 
domestic change account for the differential impact of the EU on Turkey?  
 
2.8 The case of Turkey 
 
 In the new millennium, the Europeanization process in Turkey can be divided as 
pre-2005 and post-2005 periods. Before the opening of accession, Turkey seems to be 
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textbook example of the external incentive model.79 Between 1999 and 2004 EU 
accession created pressure for the adoption for deep seated reforms since the credibility 
of EU conditionality towards Turkey was still high. However, since 2005, the credibility 
of EU accession perspective has dropped dramatically. Due to this decrease, the reform 
process in Turkey has been stalled. CEECs case shows that external incentive model 
can only works when there is credible membership perspective and clear political 
conditionality. Moreover, the EU needs to have effective conditionality bargaining 
which affects the Europeanization process. Therefore, Turkish case becomes the reverse 
example of external incentive model that explains how the Europeanization process 
could be stalled.  
 Various factors erode the EU’s effective bargaining conditionality over Turkey. 
First of all, the relations between Turkey and EU have become less asymmetrical with 
the increasing economic power of Turkey. As the degree of interdependence crucially 
shapes the pressure for adoption, the less dependence of candidate country on EU badly 
affects EU’s effective bargaining conditionality.80 After the 2001 economic crisis in 
Turkey, Turkey desperately needed the EU’s incentive to reinvigorate the economy. 
Therefore, the reform process of Turkey dramatically increased after 1999 earthquake 
and 2001 economic crisis. The asymmetrical relations between EU and Turkey at that 
time increased the EU’s effective bargaining conditionality. However, this relationship 
between the EU and Turkey has dramatically changed with the economic development 
in Turkey. In the nine years following AKP’ incumbency, Turkey became 17th biggest 
economy in the world.81 Moreover, Turkey’s economic policy has decreased its 
dependence on European market. Although the EU market still constitutes the biggest 
economic partner of Turkey, the dependence of Turkish economy on EU market is not 
high as much as CEECs or Western Balkan accession candidates. Furthermore, the 
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financial crisis within the EU market is another factor which plays the role in the 
erosion of the EU’s effective bargaining conditionality over Turkey.  
 The fading credibility of the membership perspective also reversely affects the 
Europeanization process in Turkey. The credible membership perspective was the key 
factor in the transformation of CEECs. Several reasons can be laid down for the 
weakening of credible membership perspective in Turkey. Firstly, the increasing 
opposite view for Turkey membership in the EU countries caused to decrease the 
credibility of EU membership. The constant opposite public speeches of various leaders 
of EU countries badly affect the Europeanization process in Turkey. For example, the 
speech of Nicolas Sarkozy, the former President of France, insistently underlined his 
negative position against Turkey’s accession process in his various public statements:  
“I do not believe that Turkey belongs to Europe, and for a simple 
reason: because it is in Asia Minor. What I wish to offer Turkey is a 
true partnership with Europe, but not integration into Europe.”82 
 These kinds of speeches from some leading figures of the EU have raised doubts 
on the credibility of EU’s membership perspective with regards to Turkey. At the same 
time, the public support for EU membership in Turkey has been also decreasing because 
of discriminative policies of the EU towards Turkey.83 Therefore, the decreasing 
support for EU membership also contributes the fading credibility of the EU 
membership perspective. The EU conditionality has also been undermined with the 
fading credibility of the EU membership.  
 External incentive model explains well the reasons of stalling accession process 
in the political reforms. However, it cannot explain why we do find instances of 
domestic change that conforms to EU demands in some technical areas and not in others 
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since the credibility of accession conditionality declines over time.84 Although 17 
chapters are frozen because of EU suspension on negotiations or refusal to open them, 
Turkey’s strategy is to continue the harmonization of EU acquis.85 Therefore, the 
adjustments of EU policies are continued in some technical areas. 
 As a result, Turkey is not a case sui generis. The harmonization process in 
Turkey cannot be explained by external incentive model since there is absence of 
Europeanization pressures. Domestic change in Turkey is less driven by the EU and its 
fading conditionality, but it is driven by the domestic factors.  Therefore, there is a need 
for fine-grained analysis to figure out where the cooperation is possible. With the 
external incentive model, it is not possible to define a policy coordination area under 
these circumstances. It is clear that Europeanization appears to be most effective where 
domestic policy choices align with the EU demands for change. Instead of top-down 
Europeanization process, Europeanization in Turkey appears to be ‘bottom-up’. It is the 
domestic actors which mainly shape Europeanization process in Turkey. Therefore, the 
new framework of analysis should be more fine-grained approach and more based on 
domestic actor preferences.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
NEW THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Public Policy Analysis in the Europeanization Process 
 
 
 Existing Europeanization approaches based on institutionalist theories provide 
general overview about the accession process in Turkey. External incentive model 
mainly clarifies why Europeanization process in Turkey has been stalled. However, it 
cannot explain the continuous harmonization process in some areas. Therefore, I 
suggest overcoming this problem by borrowing from ‘public policy’ literature 
developed in the United States. More specifically, I will adapt Lowi’s business cycles 
models.86 By using his model, I aim to identify areas in which cooperation is possible. 
From this, I develop a pair of related hypotheses that suggest that distributive policies 
will be more easily adopted than redistributive policies in candidate countries. I will 
focus on the Turkish transport policy to test the validity of my theoretical suggestions.  
 Before giving my theoretical suggestions, I will first point out the basic 
characteristics of European transport policy to identify areas in which convergence 
between Turkey and the EU is low or high. After giving basic objectives of the EU, the 
current situation in Turkish transport sector will be analyzed.  
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3.2 European Transport Policy 
 
 
              Free movement of goods and people is one of the main principles of the 
European Union. Electronic trade is improving with technological developments, but all 
products, except for virtual ones, should be transported eventually. Transportation is an 
important aspect of foreign trade, tourism and our daily life. Transportation has direct 
and indirect effects on economy, social life and environment. EU has put the need of a 
common transportation policy into reality by regulations in the acquis. Hence, the EU 
has been tring to remove all barriers preventing market economy and free competition. 
 Before analyzing main features of the EU transport policy, a definition of 
transport policy should be generated in order to clarify whether this policy area is 
regulatory or not. Transport policy can be  understood as a governmental field of 
responsibility, which refers to the general existence provision, pursuing the goals of 
planning and implementing the transport infrastructure anticipatorily, of coordinating 
and controlling the use of transport ways and of enabling economically, ecologically 
compatible and socially well-balanced transportation.87  
  Transport policy is regulated in a supranational level since it is one of the policy 
fields in the EU level. In other words, the top-down approaches of Europeanization exist 
in this policy field. Therefore, the transport policy field is one of the popular research 
areas in the study of Europeanization. However, the transport sector is differentiated 
from the other policy field that even current member states still have state-led approach 
toward transport. Therefore, domestic factors play a decisive role particularly in the 
specific areas of transport sector. For this reason, it is worth taking the historical process 
of European transport policy into account. 
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3.2.1 The History of the European Transport Policy 
 
 The history of European transport policy traces back to the Treaty Establishing 
the European Union (Rome Treaty). In 1957, the Treaty of Rome was signed by the six 
founding members of the European Economic Community. Transport policy was one of 
the policy areas with a specific title under the Articles 74 and 80.88 These Articles 
aimed to achieve the harmonization of transport infrastructure in the Union level to 
bolster the free movement of people and goods in the Community. However, these 
objectives were not adequately realized because transport policy stayed under the 
control of individual governments during the first thirty years of the EC.89 Member 
states considered transport as a public service, and thus, were reluctant to leave it solely 
to the private sector. Hence, the willingness to deregulate the national transport markets 
was quiet low due to different competitive conditions in the member states.90 
 The year 1985 was a turning point for the European transport policy. In that 
year, it was changed into a supranational policy of the Europe through the initiative of 
European Parliament, which took a step to change the structure. The reason for the 
European Parliament (EP) to take initiative is because the EP realized that the existing 
transport system had come to its limits in terms of passenger and goods numbers. 
Between 1965 and 1989, the volume of passenger numbers and goods, kilometers by 
car, train, shipping, air and inland waterways transport in the EU had increased by 
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246%.91 Therefore, the state-led transport system could not meet the growth 
expectations in the meantime. Moreover, Europe was experiencing an ideological 
change at that time. Neo-liberal economic policies of the European countries gave way 
to a shift towards regulatory policies favoring market mechanisms. Responding to 
increasing demands for mobility and ideological shift in politics, European transport 
policy acquired a supranational characteristic, when the Single European Act changed 
the institutional settings of the Council of Ministers by replacing unanimity with 
qualified majority voting.92 After increasing efforts for supranational efforts, the 
European Commission published a White Paper advising for liberalization and 
harmonization of the transport policy.93 Therefore, liberalization became the motto of 
the EU transport policy during the 1990s. In 1992, the first Transport Policy White 
Paper was recommending the further “opening-up of the transport market.”94 Following 
these White Papers, liberalization and intensified competition took place in the 
European transport sector. For example, the introduction of the right of non-resident 
transport haulers to operate in foreign markets materialized at that term. 
 In the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), further liberalization was pointed out as a 
solution to the upcoming enlargement. According to this Treaty, efficiency in transport 
sector can only be achieved through liberalization of state led enterprises. Furthermore, 
sustainability became another main concept of this policy. The enlargement of Sweden, 
Finland, and Austria introduced another solution to growth. Their high environmental 
standards bolstered the development of the sustainability concept.95 In 2001, the 
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Commission launched a new White Paper, titled “European transport policy for 2010 – 
time to decide.” It mainly emphasized the integrated approach towards transport policy 
in which inter-modality played an important role. This approach aimed to increase the 
share of railway in transport sector. As a result, two rail freight liberalization packages 
were introduced by 2001. The first package granted freight operators access to the Trans 
European Rail Freight Network by 2003.96 Moreover, the common rules for railway 
licensing97 and principles to govern non-discriminatory allocation of capacity, charging 
infrastructure use and safety certification98 were established by this package. The main 
step towards the integration of the rail transport market was taken with the adoption of 
the second railway package. This package aimed to remove obstacles to cross border 
services with a complete liberalization of the European market for rail freight set for 
January 2007.99 In all other areas of transport policy, the EU brought various reforms 
from technical areas to social dimension. Since this study just aims to explore the main 
concepts of EU transport policy, the detailed analysis of EU transport policy will not be 
given. 
 In sum liberalization, free market competition and sustainability are the main 
concepts of EU transport policy. The liberalization of market is one of the challenging 
areas for both member states and candidate countries. Therefore, the liberalization 
reforms in road sector and railway sector are promising areas to analyze Lowi’s 
theoretical model.   
 
 
3.3 Policy Reform in Transport Sector 
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 Transport policy constitutes one of the most significant policies in the creation 
of the European Union since an effective transport system is an essential element of 
creating an integrated and prosperous European economy.100  
 Analyzing all aspects of transport policy is an insurmountable task, since 
European transport policy entails a number of sub-policies on various transport modes 
and geographies. That states have historically committed themselves to different 
standards and modes of infrastructure on these issues makes this project even more 
complicated. This rugged landscape makes the identification of how a country can 
articulate itself to the EU’s transport policy a theoretical and practical challenge. This 
thesis is concerned with the former challenge; the main aim is to identify the specific 
areas in transport policy through which Turkey can introduce domestic reforms required 
by the European Union. 
 The EU acquis covers a wide range of issues, provisioning for actors at all levels 
across different geographies. For instance, it requires capital provisions for trucking 
companies for each vehicle in their fleet to operate in the EU. Moreover, it encourages 
states to reimburse semi-trailers that utilize water and railways on a substantial part of 
their journey. Furthermore, it seeks to achieve a consensus on how the local population 
will be compensated in transport nodes and congested areas, and officially recognizes 
more than 30 projects which are supported through the trans-European transport 
network (TEN-T) inevitably puts other projects (thus areas) in Europe in the periphery, 
and therefore at a disadvantageous position. The burden and benefits from compliance 
with the acquis are unevenly distributed across different sectors, classes and 
geographies. These burdens and benefits need not be solely pecuniary. Naturally, such 
far-reaching reforms have resonated in all levels of politics. For the national level 
implications, studies are divided into two groups: studies covering all different modes of 
transport101 and those focusing on only a single mode.102 Therefore, the various studies 
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on the impact of EU transport policy have been made in the literature since it affects 
every aspect of politics. Stevens depicts the multitude of influences on transport policy 
making akin to a “kaleidoscope.”103 
 The asymmetry with which the costs and benefits of various parts of the 
transport policy reform are distributed across different countries or over the population 
of a country raises a key challenge.104 One needs to come up with an ex-ante 
categorization of policy areas with respect to their domestic political implications. This 
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typology should, in turn, predict specific policy areas where cooperation between 
Turkey and the EU will be promising, and those where achieving cooperation will be a 
challenging task.  
 
 
 
3.4 Lowi’s Business Cycle Model: Policy Enactment as a Process of Coalition 
 
 
 
 
 Theoretically, proposed policy reforms need to satisfy all the veto points in a 
political system.105 In practice, however, strong coalitions seem to suffice for policy 
change in democratic systems. Therefore, the formation of coalition is depending on the 
attitudes of these veto points.  
 Theodore Lowi’s “arenas of power” presents a useful categorization of policy 
types with respect to the political processes that underlie their execution.106 This 
categorization, further improved by William Zimmerman, is based on the policies’ 
“impact or expected impact on society.”107 More specifically, the model argues that the 
way costs and benefits are dispersed over the electorate varies from policy to policy.  
Some policies’ impacts are relatively isolated, and those impacts seem to be pareto-
optimal (i.e. making some better off while making no one worse off). Deregulation and 
liberalization of an already defunct industry (such as state-owned railroad company 
operated deep sea-ports) may exemplify such pareto-optimal policies. Other policies 
may regulate a government’s decision to invest over another. Lowi’s model collapses 
this plethora of policies into three distinct categories, namely distributive, regulatory 
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and redistributive. What separates one issue area from another is the extent and manner 
in which political goods in a case in point can be disaggregated.108 
 Distributive policies are policies that do not necessarily need to pit the winners 
against the losers. In a sense, distributive policies pertain to how to allocate the extras 
stemming from increasing the size of the pie. Growth, trade, increase in productivity, 
technological development and the like tend to increase the resources available for 
public policy. Distributive policies are concerned with how to allocate these extra 
resources without making other parties worse off. Surely, one can argue that all politics 
is redistributive; the government uses tax dollars for each investment made. However, 
in many issue areas, decisions are made on a short-term basis, thus related “decisions 
can be made without regard to limited resources.”109 Lowi predicts such policies accrue 
on an ad hoc basis, since their enactment does not provoke reaction, each policy “unit 
can be more or less in isolation,” resembling somewhat a “patronage” scheme.110 
Government procurement, infrastructure investments that do not necessarily crowd out 
other investments exemplify such distributive policies. In line with this definition, 
policies that create new business areas will belong here. 
 In the arena of regulation, the political goods are not as subject to disaggregation 
as they are in distributive policies. These policies are mainly concerned with setting the 
“rules of the game.” There are always losers in the regulatory arena in the short term.111 
For example, the prohibition of the use of leaded fuel led to immediate increases in 
fuels costs for road freighters. Still, such regulations tend to be the product of 
bargaining and consensus building among a number of interest groups. Therefore, a 
significant part of the “cost-bearers” of regulations get something in return (e.g. a 
decrease in environmental impact tax imposed on road freighters for using unleaded 
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fuel). Besides pecuniary benefits and/or costs to their parties, regulatory policies may 
also provide political benefits to their proponents as they may be manifestations of 
political stance.112 For instance, while strict regulation on nuclear energy may be 
economically costly to all parties involved, such regulation sends strong signals to 
environmentally conscious polities. 
 Redistributive policies are like regulatory policies in the sense that relations 
among broad categories of private individuals are involved. However there are great 
differences in the nature of impact. While distributive policies that focused on how to 
divide the extra perks, redistributive policies are mostly concerned with how to divide a 
pie – thus essentially focus on from whom to take from and to whom to give. Lowi 
argues that issues that “involve” redistribution “cut closer than any others along class 
lines and activate interests in what are roughly class terms.113 Redistributive issues are 
therefore, and require substantial political capital to build achieve consensus on them. 
The classification of transport policies can be according to Lowi and Zimmerman’s 
model policy types (Table 1). 
 
 Table 3.1 The Lowi (1964) and Zimmerman (1973) Model of Policy Types 
Type of Policy Benefactors/Interested 
Parties 
Political 
Environment 
Example 
Distributive Individual, firm, 
cooperation 
Non-conflictual 
elite with support 
groups 
Privatization of 
railway sector 
Regulative Group Pluralistic, multi-
centered, “theory-
of-balance” 
Regulation of 
truck drivers’ 
working hours 
Redistributive Association Class, ideology The right of non-
resident transport 
hauliers to access 
national market. 
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 Building our theoretical framework on the Lowi-Zimmerman model entails a 
number of advantages. First, the model leads to a parsimonious conceptualization of an 
otherwise number of intractable numbers of dimensions. Second, identification of 
individual reforms with these three major categories leads to testable hypotheses 
regarding which policy reforms are more likely to succeed in Turkey. Finally, the Lowi-
Zimmerman model has a considerable promise for external validity; the model can be 
applied in other areas of reform, within, in relation to, and outside of the EU. 
 
 
 
3.4.1 Transport Policy and Potential Cooperation: Some Hypotheses 
 
 Transport policy is not one monolithic effort. Rather, it entails a number of 
areas, the interaction between them. There are plenty of stakeholders. The Lowi-
Zimmerman model, however, suggests that the level of opposition/need to build a 
coalition will vary from policy to policy. In doing so, we will treat EU’s preferences as 
constant – little change is observed over time in yearly reports regarding what is 
expected of Turkey in transport.  
 For analytical ease, we will assume that the EU’s preferences are exogenous, 
and thus not subject to bargaining with Turkey. This assumption confines our analysis 
to Turkey’s reactions to a pre-defined set of reforms. 
∫Hypothesis 1: Reclaiming impetus between Turkey and the EU will be easier in reforms 
with distributive impacts. 
Hypothesis 2: Reclaiming impetus between Turkey and the EU will be hardest in 
reforms with redistributive impacts. 
 By testing these hypotheses, my main aim is to identify the specific areas in 
transport policy through which Turkey can introduce domestic reform required by 
European Union. According to my predictions, Turkey can introduce domestic reforms 
required by the EU where the impact of reform shows redistributive characteristic. In 
order to test my hypotheses, I select two legislation piece of the EU in transport sector.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
POLICY CASES 
 
4.1 Identifying the Areas of Cooperation 
 
 The establishment and effective integration of the Turkey’s transport system has 
gained considerable salience for the EU, both on economic and strategic grounds during 
the last decade. Turkey’s increasing role as a provider of intermediate and final goods to 
the European market has put the focus on ensuring the reliable transport of these goods. 
The EU’s interest in Turkish transport system also relates to regions beyond Turkey’s 
internal market. More specifically, the EU’s strategic outlook towards the Caucuses and 
the Middle East has put further importance on Turkey as a connection hub. The 
Caucuses and its hinterland (i.e. the Turkic republics to the East of the Caspian Sea) has 
been an emerging area of interest for the EU. Similarly, the (potential) political 
transformation of Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors has placed Turkey as a strategic 
transportation hub to these countries. Finally, the exponentially growing air-passenger 
traffic from East Asia to Europe suggests Turkish airports –especially Istanbul Ataturk 
Airport- may operate as an alternative gateway that connects India and China to Europe. 
 A strategic partnership with Turkey renders three important advantages to the 
EU in connecting these areas to the European market. First, establishing connections via 
Turkey circumvents politically risky areas for rail and road transport. High levels of risk 
of internal conflict in Southern Russia (e.g. South Ossetia), the Ukraine, Lebanon, Syria 
and of international conflict on the Georgia-Russia and Iraq-Syria border put a premium 
on routes that provide alternatives to such sensitive areas. Second, Turkey’s geography 
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and its existing infrastructure allow feasible investments that would promote transport 
inter-modality, especially for energy and passenger transport.  
 In light of these facts, the integration of Turkish transportation system with 
Europe is vital for European interests. For the Turkish side also, the adjustments of EU 
technical standards are important for Turkish modernization in transportation since 
EU’s acquis promise highly competitive and resource efficient transport system. 
Therefore, the modernization of infrastructures and liberalization of Turkish 
transportation system are the key mechanisms to achieve this objective. Hence, the 
liberalization and modernization of road and rail sectors emerge as two main sub-
sectors where cooperation is promising. However, the success of cooperation depends 
on the domestic opportunity structures. Hence, I will analyze two specific policy cases 
that the EU expects Turkey to transpose into its legislation. One of them is related with 
the liberalization and modernization of railway sector in Turkey. The other one is 
liberalization of road haulages. While the former is promising cooperation, the latter is 
not. I will explain this by using the Lowi and Zimmerman’s model. 
 
4.2. The Case of Railway Modernization and Liberalization – Distributive Impact 
 
 I choose the “Second Railway Package of 2004” as a specific policy case to 
illustrate why certain harmonization process in Turkish railway sector are more 
conducive to cooperation with the EU. The “second Railway Package of 2004” is 
composed of three directives and one regulation.114 This package was legalized through 
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the favoring vote of both European Parliament and the Council in 2004. The measures 
of package aimed at revitalizing the railways through the liberalization of rail freight 
services by fully opening the rail freight market to competition as of 1 January 2007.  
Moreover, the package introduced common procedures for accident investigation and 
established Safety Authorities in each Member states.115 Regarding the package, Former 
Vice-President of the Commission, Loyale De Palacio stated that “this is the end of the 
physical and technical barriers in the European Freight Railway Transport: this new 
context will change radically the picture for the rail transport and will really boost it.”116  
 When the liberalization measures are taken into consideration, the reform 
process could lead to redistributive impacts on most of the member states. For example, 
the amendment of EU Directive 91/440 aims to full open access for freight throughout 
the EU by 1 January 2007.117 It is not surprising that this reform would raise challenges 
for existing protected national rail freight markets.118 If there is an existing domestic 
structure who is opposed to any liberalization reform of the railway market, the 
possibility of success in the reforms is very low since these reforms constitute 
redistributive characteristics. Therefore, the liberalization of railway freight would mean 
one’s gain and one’s loss in this situation. On the other hand, the absence of strong 
opposition against any reform attempts would ease the success of cooperation. Since the 
existing domestic structure is not dominated by any coalition or interest group, the 
fragmented interest groups can benefit from the reform process through the 
liberalization and modernization of market which would lead to increase in 
productivity. In sum, the success of cooperation depends on the domestic opportunity 
structures. 
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  In the case of EU member states, the Second Railway Package has to be 
transposed into national legislation until 2007 since they are obligatory legislations of 
the EU. The domestic structure can only influence the timing of transposition of EU 
laws since the infringement procedures of the EU can punish any candidate countries 
which violate the EU laws. Therefore, Lowi’s business cycle is not helpful in the 
explanation of cooperation when there is external pressures model.  
 In the case of candidate countries, the situation is different. Candidate countries 
have to transpose this reform package since it belongs to acquis communautaire. If 
credible membership perspective and clear political conditionality exists for the 
candidate country, the transposition of EU law into national legislation is possible 
without looking at whether distributive or redistributive. Therefore, Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier’s external incentive approach can explain the success of cooperation. 
However, if the EU does not provide credible membership perspective for a candidate 
country, the candidate country would not transform EU law into national legislation. 
Hence, the external incentive model eliminates any possible reform process in the 
absence of credible membership perspective. Although Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
are aware of selective rule adoption in the absence of credible membership perspective, 
they did not give conceptual framework which can explain the selectiveness.  
 In the case of Turkey’s membership process, the selectiveness in the reform 
process causes to the nullity of external incentive model. Although the EU does not 
provide credible membership perspective for Turkey, Turkey still continues to transpose 
EU acquis into its national legislations in some specific areas. Lowi’s cycle model can 
explain this variance. The Second Railway package is one of the promising areas for 
cooperation in Turkey since it has distributive impacts.  
 Railway sector in Turkey is controlled by the government agency Turkish State 
Railways General Directorate (TCDD). TCDD has custody over all inner and inter city 
railway networks in Turkey operating under the Ministry of Transport. The rail market 
in Turkey has not developed well since the investments on rail industry have been 
neglected by the recent governments. 
 Many factors have impeded the growth of the rail industry in Turkey. 
Establishing a nationwide rail network was of paramount importance to the early 
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Republican regime. This focus on consolidating the nascent Republican People’s Party 
government’s hold on the country often came at the expense of other public investment 
projects and overtaxing the war-ridden population.119 While this rail network indeed 
connected the east of the country to the West, a significant portion of the rural areas still 
remained too peripheral to offer their products to the internal and world markets. The 
government often chose to establish strategic linkages (e.g. linking coal production to 
steel factories and deep sea ports) at the expense of popular demand. In terms of the 
Lowi-Zimmerman model, rail investment had substantial redistributive impacts, often 
satisfying strategic imperatives at the expense of popular demands in the first year of 
Republic. Thus, it is hardly surprising that most of the rail investments were made 
during the quasi-authoritarian first two decades of the republic.120 
 The passage to the multi-party system in 1946, and the subsequent turnover of 
the incumbency to the populist Democrat Party (DP) changed the investment patterns of 
transportation in Turkey. Infrastructure investment has gargantuan costs, necessitating 
the involvement of the state. The more populist a government is, the more likely the rail 
projects may find themselves pushed back in the agenda. Not surprisingly, the 
Democrat Party effectively froze rail investments and instead opted for establishing 
road networks. Although comparatively inefficient, refocusing on road networks 
allowed the DP to connect most parts of Turkey to the markets at a lower cost. 
Furthermore, road networks allowed private enterprises to flourish; compared to the rail 
network, entry barriers were virtually non-existent. In other words, the focus on road-
transport distributive: from a private enterprise perspective, road-transport did indeed 
enlarge the pie. The favoring of road transport as the main means of goods and 
passenger transportation continued until the new millennium. As a result, 95% of all the 
freight, movement and the bus transportation 90% intercity passenger traffic in Turkey. 
In contrast, almost half of Turkey’s rail network still belongs to the investments made 
between 1923 and 1946. (When Turkish Republic was founded in 1923, it had 3660 km 
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lines from Ottoman Empire. Between 1923-1940, the length of line reached to 8637 km. 
Starting from 1950, just 1871 km length of railroad was opened to service. When AKP 
government came to power, Turkey had 10917 km railway line).121 
 Despite such political hurdles emanating from redistributive impact of rail 
liberalization, the AKP government has been simultaneously pushing liberalization 
reforms and infrastructure investments. As recently laid by the minister of 
transportation, Turkey pursues a strategy of decoupling infrastructure and rail services, 
and focusing on the privatization of the latter.122 From the Lowi-Zimmerman 
framework, one can argue that decoupling infrastructure investments from rail services 
is tantamount to repackaging the redistributive impacts of reform into (at least partially) 
a distributive framework. The privatization of the rail services is expected to cut down 
on costs while improving the efficiency and the reliability of the services. While these 
privatized services will initially compete with the road haulers on most profitable routes 
(i.e. Istanbul-Ankara and Ankara-Konya routes), the sustained growth in Turkish 
economy has been creating a steady demand for both road and rail services, thus making 
it easier for AKP to sustain the coalition to promote the modernization of the rail 
infrastructure in Turkey. 
 In sum, the Second Railway Package has distributive impacts in Turkish railway 
sector because of various factors. Firstly, the absence of a strong coalition in favor of 
status quo in the Turkish railway sector enables entries to the market. Since the Turkish 
railway sector has been regulated by the state led company, the sector has been stayed 
as an untouched by private sectors. Therefore, any reform which would increase 
efficiency is welcomed by domestic actors to get more advantages from the reform 
results. Secondly, the liberalization and modernization of defunct railway industry will 
automatically lead to increase the size of the market. Therefore, the allocation of extra 
stemming from increasing the size of the pie is the area of distributive policies. 
Moreover, the AKP government policy in railway sector is converged with the EU 
Second Railway Package. Hence, the cooperation on this policy cases is very high 
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because of distributive impacts and convergent domestic policy. Therefore, reclaiming 
impetus between Turkey and the EU is easier in Second Railway Package since it has 
distributive impacts.   
 
4.3 The Case of Road Haulage – Redistributive Impact 
 
 
 I select my second policy case in the area of road sector to illustrate why the 
reclaiming impetus between Turkey and the EU is not easier in reforms with 
redistributive impacts. The protections on the liberalization of road haulage services 
removed with the introduction of a new Council regulation on 26 March 1992. This 
regulation brought a right of access to the market in the carriage of goods by road 
within the Community to or from the territory of a Member State or passing across the 
territory of one or more Member States.123 This regulation is followed by a series of 
new adjustments which aim complete liberalization in road haulage sector. On 25 
October 1993, the Council passed a new regulation which lay down the conditions 
under which non-resident carriers may operate national road haulage service within a 
Member State.124 This regulation was a turning point in the name of EU Common 
Transport Policy (CTP), since it came in the form of liberalization of international 
transport and the introduction of the right of non-resident transport hauliers to operate in 
foreign markets.125 In this respect, it was a first step to change “cabotage system” in 
member states. Knill and Dirk clearly points out that “the cabotage directive allowed for 
highly regulated domestic markets and for quantitative restrictions and price controls to 
co-exist alongside a deregulated international market.”126 Therefore, this regulation 
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aimed to remove internal barriers in road sectors. In this respect, the impact of this 
reform is the redistribution of powers and resources between domestic actors. 
 When European cases are taken into consideration in this policy area, the 
variances of implementation between countries is so high that shows the redistributive 
characteristic of the reform. The study of Knill and Lehmkuhl compares Britain, France, 
Germany and Italy in respect to impact of the law in these countries. According to their 
analysis, Britain and Italy are distinguished from France and Germany since their policy 
arena was dominated by group of actors favoring the existing regulatory regime.127 
Therefore, the changes in these markets are not supposed to be easy task when Lowi’s 
cycle model is taken into consideration. As I pointed in my first case, the enforcement 
procedures of the EU force these countries to imply EU laws into their national 
legislation. However, Italian experience in this field gives some clues for Turkish case. 
 In 1993, the liberalization of transport sector was not an easy task for Italy 
because of a dominance of actors opposing any liberalization of the transport sector. 
The strong position of domestic hauliers was very powerful that did not give any chance 
to reform attempts. Knill and Lehmkuhl define the situation as: 
 
 “Neither was there significant change in the polarized patterns of 
interest intermediation through which the huge number of smaller 
hauliers’ associations successfully pressurized public actors, whereas 
the more moderate, pro-liberal stance of the larger firms’ associations 
went virtually unheard. As a consequence, European policies did not 
increase the capacity of public actors to formulate policy goals 
autonomously and implement them in the face of group opposition.”128  
 
 The powerful associations shaped reform process of Italy since redistributive 
policies do not focus on how to divide extra perks but how to divide a pie. It essentially 
focuses on from whom to take from and to whom to give. Therefore, the existing 
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associations who are benefiting status quo seek to block reform process. In this respect, 
the issue of cabotage is the toughest nut to crack in the process of European transport 
policy.129  
 Turkish case shows differences from 4 countries in respect to road haulage. In 
Turkey, 96 percent of passengers and 92.9 percent of freight are transported by road.130 
Thanks to these numbers, more than 1600 companies employing 400.000 people are 
working in the road haulage sector.131 These numbers make Turkey the leader in the 
region. The sector is represented by several associations which are differentiated 
between each other according to their objectives. International Transporters’ 
Association (UND) is the one which is established to solve and present sector problems 
in national and international problems. It approximately has 940 members.132 Moreover, 
Logistic Association (LODER) is another occupational organization which focuses on 
conferences, education and information logistic companies and it has 2505 members.133 
Hence, road haulage sector in Turkey is represented by strong coalition elements.  
 Turkey’s geostrategic position makes it natural hub for logistic sector. Turkey’s 
foreign trade is mainly made through road. According to figures which is published by 
TUIK, after shipping, road has the biggest share in the foreign trade with 41 percent for 
exports and 23.6 percent for import.134 At the same time, more than 50% of foreign 
trade is realized with the EU.135 Therefore, Turkey has made adjustments in its 
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transportation policies and standards to be consistent with the EU standards. With the 
introduction of Road Transport No. 4925 which entered into force in 2003, the access to 
Turkish road haulage market becomes available.136 However, regulation on market 
access still constitutes differences in regards to EU, just like within the EU.  
 In 2009, the EU passed a new regulation which aims to modernize, simplifies 
and streamlines rules in the road haulage transport sector to improve the efficiency of 
the EU by harmonizing the cabotage and minimizing the administrative burden to the 
industry.137  Turkey has not harmonized this regulation into its national law yet because 
of several developments in the sector which make the further cooperation in this area of 
policy difficult. Since the sector is represented by the strong coalition elements, any 
harmonization attempts must coincide with interests of lobbies when the credible 
membership perspective does not exist.  
 Harmonization process in road haulage sector had been supported by coalition 
elements until 2008 since these adjustment worked for the sector in a two way. First of 
all, any costs are caused by the changes of technical standards were covered by the 
increasing trade rate with EU. Between 2003 – 2006 Turkey’s export to the EU 
increased in 103 percent.138 Moreover, 90 percent of trucks which transport these goods 
were from Turkey.139 Secondly, with the help of EU standardization effects, Turkey 
logistic sector become more valuable. However, this positive situation turned back to 
negative one with the EU’s changing policy to Turkey in road haulage sector. Although 
Turkey is a part of Custom Union (CU), the EU imposed a quota policy to Turkish 
trucks. According to report of OECD, around 200000 truck load per year are operated 
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by road, but the limited number of Turkish truckers get permits from the EU. Although 
the export rate to EU increase in 103 percent, this sector has only seen 50 percent 
increase in the quota of permits.140 Moreover, this problem is aggravated with 
Bulgaria’s entry charge policy. After 28 June 2008, Bulgaria started to impose 271$ on 
per Turkish truck.141 Therefore, EU policies on Turkish haulage sector create a situation 
of unfair competition. EU advisor of UND clearly stated that EU policies toward the 
sector deter the companies in Turkey to follow EU standards. Under these 
circumstances following the EU policies can just cause further losing of market.142 
Therefore, two important points in the EU’s reform agenda, working hour regulations 
and mandatory capital provisions for each vehicle employed in a company’s fleet may 
have significant political backlash. 
 Moreover, the associations of road haulage constantly push the government to 
follow same policies as EU imposes on Turkish sector. Therefore, under these 
circumstances, continue of harmonization process would not be possible. The leader of 
UND states that “the asymmetric relation between EU and Turkey started to damage the 
trucking industry and the government has to take some precaution to protect Turkish 
logistic sector.”143 
 In sum, the re-introduction of harmonization process in the road haulage sector 
is a difficult task because of redistributive impacts of reforms. As long as the EU does 
not provide credible membership perspective to Turkey, the possibility of adjustments 
in this area is very low. If only EU changes its policy to Turkish road haulage industry, 
coalition elements can influence the government for further harmonization. In other 
words, the Europeanization can be used for further modernization of industry and for 
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the increase of trade. In the absence of these factors, the reclaiming impetus between 
Turkey and the EU is not easier in the transposition of road haulage acquis since it has 
redistributive impacts. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This thesis mainly aims to identify opportunities and challenges for bolstering 
EU – Turkey cooperation on transport policy. The identification of the possible areas of 
cooperation is important since the accession process of Turkey has been stalled for 
seven years. By identifying opportunities and challenges in specific areas, the EU 
reform process in Turkey can be again revitalized. Focusing on transport policy, this 
study asks why Turkey adopts certain EU policies and technical standards while being 
reluctant to adopt in others.  
 To explain the variance in the harmonization of EU policies and technical 
standards, the Europeanization theoretical framework in the accession process are 
examined. And this study clearly shows that existing Europeanization approaches based 
on institutionalist theories provide general overview about the accession process in 
Turkey. External incentive model mainly clarifies why Europeanization process in 
Turkey has been stalled. However, it hardly explains the continuous adjustments of EU 
policies in some areas. Therefore, I suggest overcoming this problem by borrowing 
from ‘public policy’ literature developed in the United States. More specifically, I 
adapted Lowi’s business cycles models.  By using his model, I identified areas in which 
cooperation is possible. From this, I develop a pair of related hypotheses that suggest 
that distributive policies will be more easily adopted than redistributive policies in 
candidate countries. I focused on the Turkish transport policy to test the validity of my 
theoretical suggestions.  
 I analyze two specific policy cases that the EU expects Turkey to transpose into 
its legislation. One of them is related with the liberalization and modernization of 
railway sector (the Second Railway Package) in Turkey. The other one is liberalization 
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and modernization of road haulages. Analysis on both policy areas shows me that the 
cooperation on the liberalization and modernization of railway sector is very high 
because of distributive impacts and convergent domestic policy. Therefore, reclaiming 
impetus between Turkey and the EU is easier in Second Railway Package since it has 
distributive impacts. On the other hands, the introduction of harmonization process in 
the road haulage sector is a difficult task because of redistributive impacts of reforms. 
As long as the EU does not provide credible membership perspective to Turkey, the 
possibility of adjustments in this area is very low. If only EU changes its policy to 
Turkish road haulage industry, coalition elements can influence the government for 
further harmonization. In other words, the Europeanization can be used for further 
modernization of industry and also for the increase of trade. In the absence of these 
factors, the reclaiming impetus between Turkey and the EU is not easier in the 
transposition of road haulage acquis since it has redistributive impacts. 
 Lastly, this thesis seeks to make significant contribution to Turkey’s accession 
literature by dwelling on specific area, rather than meta-policy. In the literature most of 
studies argue Turkey’s accession prospects from a general perspective while empirical 
studies on the domestic impact of EU accession on specific policies, political 
institutions and political processes in Turkey are still rare. I did this focusing on 
transport area since the studies on transport is very rare. There are just several master 
thesis but they are mostly descriptive. This study introduced a novel theoretical 
approach to the EU studies, at a time and place where political conjuncture challenges 
and perhaps paralyses existing EU Europeanization accession approaches. In this 
respect, this approach can be seen as complementary to the existing approaches rather 
than contradictory. Therefore, this approach can be applied across policy and country 
areas. 
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